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Area studies centres in the West take up an unusual position in the global politics of 
education and mobility. On the one hand, they originate in initiatives to improve Western 
society’s knowledge of foreign areas and were sustained during the Cold War because 
governments and intelligence services believed that an ongoing knowledge base about the 
opposing bloc served national interests. The School of Slavonic and East European Studies 
(SSEES) in London, where I taught part-time in 2011–12, is no exception, having been 
formed during the First World War as a centre for “Slavonic studies” at the same time as its 
founders campaigned for the British government to accept the war aims of the Slavonic and 
Romanian nationalist movements in eastern Europe (Pearton 1993). In the late 20th century 
and after, scholars in east European studies have thus had to confront both the “essentializing 
and exoticizing tendencies” of traditional area studies and the “bounded spatial imaginary” 
that too narrow a focus on area risks bringing about (Stenning 2005: 381). They have 
simultaneously become part of the contemporary corporate university, required to contribute 
to the income generation of a larger institution (not least at SSEES, which merged with the 
self-described world-leading University College London in 1999).  
On the other hand, however, as centres of expertise about a certain region of the world, 
area studies departments are also part of academic circuits that flow between their Western 
locations and their regions of study. (These circuits are not novel to the post-Cold War world; 
the Czech historian Tomáš Masaryk, later the first president of Czechoslovakia, was among 
the first lecturers at SSEES.) Both the staff and student communities are a mixture of people 
from, or with family origins in, the region of interest and thoroughly “outsider” scholars such 
as myself (some from the country where the department is located, others from various 
countries in Western Europe or North America). The politics of knowledge in area studies 
teaching are thus even more complex than they appear at first glance. As an Anglophone and 
Briton with no family connections to eastern Europe, when teaching at SSEES I faced the 
paradox that students from the region we studied had effectively travelled away from it in 
order to learn about it from my colleagues and me.  
The challenges for critical pedagogy in this setting – questions of positionality, authority, 
representation... – are many. Yet before even considering what we do in the classroom, we 
need to acknowledge deep structural constraints that will have affected our teaching before 
we have even begun to teach – the stratification of who is even able to enter the classroom 
and cross the border of the state where the classroom lies. This stratification takes place in the 
UK through policies that affect students who are non-UK citizens unequally depending on 
which state(s) they are citizens of. Since the introduction of tuition fees in 1998, UK 
universities have charged citizens of the European Economic Area (EEA) the same rate as 
UK citizens but charged other states’ citizens far more. Though fees have increased 
dramatically for all students following government-mandated rises in 2006 and 2011, the 
EEA/non-EEA differential has remained. In 2013–14, undergraduate fees at SSEES were 
£9,000 per year at “UK/EU” rate and £14,750 for “overseas,” fees for most postgraduate 
courses £6,000–£9,750/£13,770–16,250, and research degree fees £4,400/£15,750.  
Importantly for east European studies, the enlargement of the European Union has 
periodically widened the availability of “UK/EU” fees (even as fee rises have increased the 
financial baseline that these students must attain). The EU accession of eight east European 
states plus Malta and Cyprus in 2004 opened the “UK/EU” rate for study at SSEES or any 
other UK university to their citizens and enabled them to work while studying. The same 
privilege was extended to Romanian and Bulgarian citizens in 2007, though with onerous 
registration procedures for students who planned to work (Ciobanu 2013), and Croatian 
citizens from 2013 onwards are likely to face similar measures. These changes are welcome 
to the citizens of new EU member states and increase the diversity of student populations, but 
do not benefit students from non-member states, who unlike EEA citizens will also require 
visas to enter the UK at all. Access to an east European studies education in Britain, then, is 
differentiated by where the EU boundaries currently lie, just as enlargement has interfered 
with existing cross-border mobilities across what must now be secured as the EU”s eastern 
frontier.  
This is not to suggest that study in the UK is feasible for all prospective students from the 
EEA: rises in “home rate” fees compound the high cost of living (particularly in London) and 
the growing scarcity and precarity of part-time employment. EEA citizenship nonetheless 
brings formal privileges from which non-EEA citizens are excluded; non-EEA students face 
not only higher tuition fees but an ever harsher regime of visa applications and fees, checks to 
establish their “credibility” as a student which verge on the invasive, and requirements to 
regularly register their whereabouts with the university while in the UK for fear the 
institution will be sanctioned by the UK Border Authority. To a greater degree than EEA 
students, they are caught within the “migration–security nexus” (Faist 2004), in which states’ 
policies and practices of border control are informed by their beliefs about risks to national 
security and their assessments of prospective entrants as threats. This long pre-dated 9/11 but 
tightened after it (Adamson 2006). In the UK, the nexus has hardened further since 2010 as a 
result of the coalition government’s explicit intent to reduce net immigration.  
The same year that I taught at SSEES saw the beginnings of a free universities movement 
in the UK intended to counteract the 2011 increase in fees. How, though, would this have 
benefited potential students unable to even enter the UK, let alone to afford “international” 
fees at SSEES? While recognising that many other forms of inequality intersect with 
citizenship, I share Stuart Tannock’s concern that “the demand for educational equality [must 
be extended] beyond national borders” (2013: 450). Part of our critical pedagogy inside and 
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